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A REFLECTION ON TAX COLLECTING:
OPENING A CAN OF WORMS TO CLEAN UP A
COLLECTION DUE PROCESS
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Pippa Browde*
ABSTRACT
Almost 20 years ago Congress enacted the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98), with the intention of protecting
taxpayers against perceived abuses in tax collection by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). RRA 98 contained provisions creating the so-called collection due
process (CDP) provisions. CDP changed existing law by providing taxpayers
with a pre-deprivation right to an administrative hearing and judicial review of
any proposed collection actions by the IRS such as liens or levies.
CDP has been both championed as a valuable mechanism to protect
taxpayers from improper collection and criticized as a tool used by taxpayers
making meritless arguments to further delay payment of tax. Regardless, the CDP
provisions have exacted a toll on the tax administrative system, particularly on the
IRS Office of Appeals, which conducts the CDP hearings, and the U.S. Tax Court,
which generally has judicial review of the administrative hearings. CDP cases
often require a disproportionate share of resources to resolve. One reason for this
is that CDP cases can be messy. CDP cases can involve mistakes or anomalies
made by the IRS and are often brought by taxpayers pro se. One particularly
messy factual scenario occurs when a taxpayer raises an issue in a non-CDP tax
year and asks the IRS and the Tax Court to adjudicate as to the non-CDP year.
For example, if a taxpayer alleges that he or she has a credit from a prior year that
should carry forward to satisfy a tax liability that remains unpaid or alleges that
he or she has made payments that were applied to a non-CDP year that were
meant to apply to the CDP year, the Tax Court has struggled with whether and
how it can properly exercise jurisdiction over the non-CDP year.
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This Article makes two novel contributions. First, it highlights how CDP
cases can be particularly messy and how the IRS and Tax Court have struggled in
resolving CDP cases. In particular, this Article examines the Tax Court's difficulty
in determining its proper jurisdiction in CDP cases in which the taxpayer raises
issues in non-CDP years by examining two relevant cases, Freije v. Commissioner
and Weber v. Commissioner. Concluding that the Tax Court has properly
exercised (or limited) its jurisdiction in both Freije and Weber, this Article
reconciles the two cases in light of the purpose of the CDP provisions on the one
hand and the Tax Court's limited jurisdictional grant on the other. Second, this
Article makes recommendations to the IRS on how to encourage administrative
resolution of messy CDP cases to prevent litigation and reduce the cost of CDP.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Resolving domestic collection cases arising out of the so-called
collection due process (CDP) of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98) has become a serious challenge for the
U.S. Tax Court, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the taxpayers
embroiled in those disputes.' CDP cases often involve smaller dollar
amounts and pro se litigants.2 For the individual taxpayer and small-scale
practitioners, however, the resolution of CDP cases can be a mysterious and
time-consuming process.3 Exacerbating these challenges are the facts that
1. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98),
Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3401, 112 Stat. 685, 746-50 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6320
(West 2011 & Supp. 2016); I.R.C. § 6320 note (2012); I.R.C. § 6330 (West 2011 & Supp.
2016)). The challenges facing taxpayers, the IRS, and the Tax Court in CDP cases have
been raised in the National Taxpayer Advocate's (NTA) reports to Congress. See 1 NINA
E. OLSON, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., IRS, PUB. 2104 (REV. 12-2015), ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 2015, at 488-98 (2015) [hereinafter NTA 2015 REPORT],
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volum
el.pdf. In the report, the NTA noted, "Since 2001, CDP has been one of the federal tax
issues most frequently litigated in the federal courts .... The trend continues this
year ..... Id. at 481. The NTA examined the 79 opinions on CDP cases issued by courts
from June 1, 2014, through May 31, 2015. Id. For a list of cases reviewed, see id. 592-96
app. 3, tbl.5.
Throughout this Article, CDP and collection cases are used somewhat
interchangeably.
2. The Tax Court faces generally high percentages of pro se petitioners. Recent
numbers from the Tax Court estimate that 82 percent of petitions were pro se. James S.
Halpern, What Has the U.S. Tax Court Been Doing? An Update, 151 TAX NOTES 1277,
1282 (2016). Judge Halpern's remarks were presented at the 2016 Laurence Neal
Woodworth Memorial Lecture in Washington, D.C., on May 5, 2016.
3. See infra Parts II.A.4, II.A.5. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
generally affects cosmopolitan wealthy international individuals with access to global
banking, NTA 2015 REPORT, supra note 1, at 74, whereas CDP cases often are quite the
opposite. See infra Part II.A.5.
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the IRS is being pushed to resolve CDP cases in a declining budgetary
environment and that CDP cases are often difficult and unnecessarily
complex.4 Litigated CDP cases often involve prior actions by the IRS that
resulted in erroneous assessments or failure of the IRS to give proper and
adequate notice.s Coupling the mistakes made by the IRS with an
unsophisticated and unrepresented taxpayer, CDP cases inevitably result in
a complexity of issues that require a disproportionate share of administrative
and judicial resources to resolve. By the time such a collection case gets to
litigation, it has slipped through all the cracks, and the administrative
procedures intended to fix or solve the problems have failed. The Tax Court,
seeking to comply with the spirit of CDP provisions, often struggles mightily
and with questionable success to fashion a remedy that fits neatly within its
limited jurisdiction involving collection cases.' After explaining the historical
background of the problem of IRS tax collection and the enactment of the
CDP provisions of the RRA 98, this Article focuses on how, in the absence
of a legislative fix, the Tax Court may remain flexible in resolving these cases
and how the IRS might develop and implement policies to support early
resolution of these cases at the administrative level.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief review of the
development of the law on tax procedure and collection, including the
passage of the CDP provisions. Part III of the Article addresses the
jurisdiction of the Tax Court; policies supporting judicial efficiency; and the
Tax Court's struggle to define the extent to which it can assert jurisdiction
over tax years or periods not subject to the proposed collection action,
including the two principal cases on the subject: Freije v. Commissioner and
Weber v. Commissioner.' Part IV critiques the Tax Court's analysis in Freije
and looks at how the Tax Court can maintain flexibility to meet the goals of
CDP within the confines of the court's limited jurisdictional grant. That
analysis demonstrates that the Tax Court properly analyzes its jurisdiction
in CDP cases by analogizing to the court's jurisdiction in deficiency cases
and that the court properly takes a functional and flexible approach to
resolving legitimate taxpayer disputes in CDP cases. Part IV concludes with
suggestions on how the IRS can best support the policies of CDP by
4. For complete discussion on the underfunding of the IRS, see Jonathan Barry
Forman & Roberta F. Mann, Making the Internal Revenue Service Work, 17 FLA. TAX
REV. 725, 763-72 (2015).
For an explanation on why CDP cases are complex, see infra Parts II.A.4, II.A.5.
5. For an example, see infra Part III.B.
6. See infra Part III.
7. Weber v. Comm'r, 138 T.C. 348 (2012); Freije v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 14 (2005).
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encouraging administrative resolution of these CDP cases prior to litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical and Current Law on Tax Collection
This Part provides a brief overview of tax procedure, the historical
context of tax collection law leading up to the enactment of CDP, and a
sketch of the CDP procedures with an emphasis on taxpayer's rights to
judicial review of administrative CDP hearings.
1. General Tax Procedure Prior to Collection of Tax
Before the IRS can collect a penny of tax, the tax must be assessed or
recorded on the government's books.' Assessments arise in a variety of
contexts; the most common form is a summary assessment resulting from the
IRS recording the amount a taxpayer shows as tax due on a return.9
Deficiency assessments result from a determination of tax liability following
a dispute, if the IRS determines a taxpayer's liability is greater than the
amount shown on a return.1 0
Once the tax is assessed, if it remains unpaid, the IRS must issue the
taxpayer notice of the amount of the liability due and demand immediate
8. E.g., I.R.C. § 6201(a)(1) (2012). The assessment against a taxpayer is akin to a
judgment against a debtor; it is the government's formal record of a taxpayer's liability
for a tax. See, e.g., United States v. Klimek, 952 F. Supp. 1100, 1109 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citing
Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260 (1935)).
Withholding is, in effect, a prepayment of tax that is credited to the taxpayer,
but the withheld amounts are not actually credited against the taxpayer's debt until the
taxpayer calculates and submits his or her return. I.R.C. § 31(a); see also United States
v. Roberts, 425 F. Supp. 1281, 1283 (D. Del. 1977) (discussing the withholding
mechanism for taxable income). Thus, when the taxpayer files his or her return at the
end of the year, he or she either pays the balance due or is refunded the overpaid amount.
Roberts, 425 F. Supp. at 1283. Withholding is required on wages paid to employees by
employers. I.R.C. § 3402(a).
9. See I.R.C. § 6201(a)(1). Other types of assessments include deficiency and
jeopardy assessments. See id. § 6215(a) (deficiency assessments); id. §§ 6851(a), 6861(a),
6862(a) (jeopardy assessments).
10. Id. § 6211(a) (defining deficiency); id. § 6215 ("If the taxpayer files a petition
with the Tax Court, the entire amount redetermined as the deficiency by the decision of
the Tax Court which has become final shall be assessed and shall be paid upon notice
and demand from the Secretary.").
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payment (called "notice and demand")." At the time of the assessment, a
federal tax lien in favor of the government attaches to all of the taxpayer's
property. 12 This lien is referred to as a silent or secret lien because it applies
automatically when a taxpayer does not pay.' 3 The IRS may file a notice of
federal tax lien to put other creditors of the taxpayer on notice.1 4 If the
taxpayer does not pay after the IRS issues notice and demand, the IRS may
also collect by levying on the taxpayer's property. 5 The United States also
has authority to bring civil suits to collect taxes and enforce liens. 16
2. The History of the Law of Tax Collection Before Enactment of CDP
Prior to the enactment of RRA 98, a taxpayer had few pre-collection
remedies, and none afforded the taxpayer judicial review. 7 A taxpayer could
not enjoin the government or prevent collection-he or she had to pay the
11. Id. § 6303(a). Notice and demand for payment must be made as soon as
practicable but not later than 60 days after the tax is assessed. Id.
12. Id. § 6321. The automatic lien attaches to "all property and rights to property,
whether real or personal," of the taxpayer. Id.
13. Id.; see, e.g., Pansier v. United States, 225 B.R. 657, 660-61 & n.3 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1998) (discussing liens under § 6321 as secret liens).
14. I.R.C. § 6323(a)-(b) explains priorities over federal tax lien: If a creditor has
actual knowledge of a federal tax lien, the creditor will lose protected status even absent
the IRS filing a notice of federal tax lien, i.e., through constructive notice under § 6323(f).
See id. § 6323(a); see also Brightwell v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 1464, 1470 (S.D. Ind.
1992).
15. I.R.C. § 6331(a) (granting authority to levy if taxpayer fails to pay within 10
days after notice and demand given). Typically, levy is made on taxpayer's property
within the control of a third party, such as bank accounts. See WILLIAM D. ELLIOTr,
FEDERAL TAX COLLECTIONS, LIENS & LEVIES ¶ 13.06 (2016), Westlaw. Section 664(h)
authorizes continuing levy on wages. I.R.C. § 6331(h) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016).
16. I.R.C. §§ 7401-7403 (2012).
17. The RRA 98 and the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, in addition to CDP
provisions explained infra, codified what had been administrative practice to allow
administrative review of certain types of collection determinations by the IRS. See id. §
6159(d) (codifying administrative review of IRS termination of installment agreements);
id.
§ 7122(d) (codifiying administrative review of termination of offers in compromise); see
also American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 843(b), 118 Stat. 1418,
1600 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6159(d)-(f)); RRA 98, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3462(a), 112 Stat. 685, 764-65 (current version at I.R.C. § 7122(d)). I.R.C. § 6326 was
added in 1988 by the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-647, § 6238(a), 102 Stat. 3342, 3743, to allow a taxpayer administrative appeal of a
notice of federal tax lien.
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tax and pursue a claim for a refund." Furthermore, it is well-settled that
principles of due process do not apply to tax collection." The U.S. Supreme
Court has consistently held that the government's interest in efficient tax
collection is more important than notions of due process.20
Almost 20 years ago, the IRS was faced with a public relations
nightmare as Congress conducted hearings on perceived abuses that IRS
employees engaged in to effectuate collection of taxes.21 Out of those
18. See I.R.C. § 7421 (prohibiting suits "for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax"). But see, e.g., id. § 7426(a)(1), (b)(1) (providing an
injunctive remedy for third parties if property wrongfully subject to levy); O'Hagan v.
United States, 86 F.3d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 1996).
"The United States, as a sovereign entity is immune from suit unless it consents
to be sued." Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir.
2011) (citations omitted). Congress has partially waived sovereign immunity for tax
refund actions, as long as taxpayers meet the prescribed requirements. Id. (citing I.R.C.
§§ 6532(a), 7422(a)). In general, a taxpayer seeking a refund of "erroneously or illegally
assessed" taxes may commence a civil action against the United States but only after first
filing a claim with the IRS and exhausting his or her administrative remedies. I.R.C. §
7422(a) (prohibiting suits in district court "until a claim for refund or credit has been
duly filed with the [IRS]"); 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012 & Supp. II 2014) (providing district
courts with subject matter jurisdiction for tax refund suits); see also United States v.
Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 4 (2008) (citing United States v. Dalm, 494
U.S. 596, 602 (1990)). Any claim for a tax credit or refund must be brought "within 3
years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid,
whichever of such periods expires ... later." I.R.C. § 6511(a) (2012).
19. CDP is not the same as constitutional due process, and it has long been held
that the IRS does not have to afford traditional procedural due process (notice and
opportunity for a hearing) prior to collecting tax. Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 595-
97 (1931) (holding tax collection is an essential government need justifying post-
deprivation hearing). For further discussion, see Leslie Book, The Collection Due
Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1145, 1177-
78 (2004) ("Given the limited constitutional nature of tax cases, it is generally thought
that the CDP provisions have little to do with constitutional procedural due process
protections." (citation omitted)).
20. See Phillips, 283 U.S. at 595 ("Where, as here, adequate opportunity is afforded
for a later judicial determination of the legal rights, summary proceedings to secure
prompt performance of pecuniary obligations to the government have been consistently
sustained." (citations omitted)).
21. For a thorough discussion of the political history, see Bryan T. Camp, Tax
Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 78-87 (2004) [hereinafter
Camp, Paradigm Shift]. Professor Bryan Camp describes the "heat of the moment [from
which] RRA 98 emerged"-out of hearings that "were high political theater and, as with
most theater, were mostly fictional." Id. at 81.
572017]
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hearings and political criticism, Congress enacted RRA 98, which enhanced
taxpayers' rights to process prior to enforced collection by creating the CDP
regime.22 Despite resulting policy-based criticisms by tax professionals and
academics, CDP provisions remain on the books, largely unaltered from the
original RRA 98 statute. 23 The statute requires that, in the period between
the assessment of a tax and its enforced collection (usually by lien or levy),
the IRS both provides the taxpayer notice of the proposed collection action
and offers an administrative hearing for the taxpayer to raise any relevant
issues challenging the collection, such as offering collection alternatives or
raising any appropriate spousal defenses.2 4 The hearing officer must balance
the government's interest in efficient tax collection with the taxpayer's
"legitimate concern" that collection "be no more intrusive than necessary." 25
The U.S. Tax Court has jurisdiction to review the hearing officer's
determination.26
This history became particularly relevant in 2016, as the IRS was under attack
for a number of reasons, including a scandal involving political biases with respect to tax
exempt organizations. See Forman & Mann, supra note 4, at 763-81 (discussing key
problems with the IRS); Dylan Matthews, Everything You Need to Know About the IRS
Scandal in One FAQ, WASH. POST (May 14, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/05/14/everything-you-need-to-
know-about-the-irs-scandal-in-one-faq/.
22. RRA 98 § 3401, 112 Stat. at 746-50. RRA 98 stemmed from years of political
frustration with what some lawmakers, with tremendous public support, viewed as an
overaggressive IRS. See Camp, Paradigm Shift, supra note 21.
23. For scholarly commentary on the value of CDP provisions, see Book, supra
note 19, at 1149 ("Although CDP embraces rule of law principles, it is far from perfect.
It is both overbroad and underinclusive."); Camp, Paradigm Shift, supra note 21, at 91-
132.
The CDP provisions in RRA 98 were amended in 2000 and 2006. See Tax Relief
and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 407(b)(2)-(3), 120 Stat. 2922, 2961-
62 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6330(b)(1), (c)(4)); Pension Protection Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 855(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1019 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 6330(d)(1) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016)); Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. G, § 313(b)(2)(A), (d), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-587, 2763A-642,
2763A-643 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1)(A); I.R.C. § 6330(e)(1) (2012)).
By and large, the amendments to the statute have been minimal. The most notable was
in 2006, when Congress vested the Tax Court with exclusive jurisdiction for judicial
review of CDP cases. See Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 855(a), 120 Stat. at 1019.
24. I.R.C. § 6330(a) (requiring IRS to provide notice of proposed collection); id.
§ 6330(b) (right of taxpayer to hearing); id. § 6330(c) (matters considered at the hearing).
25. Id. § 6330(c)(3).
26. I.R.C. § 6330(d) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016).
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Judicial review of an agency determination may seem quite
commonplace to those familiar with the practice of administrative law, but
the grant of jurisdiction to the Tax Court to review CDP determinations is
regarded as "one of the most significant modern developments in the
operation of the Tax Court." 27 Senior Tax Court Judge James S. Halpern
seemed to acknowledge the challenges the Tax Court has had with its
jurisdiction in CDP cases when, nearly 20 years after the enactment of the
CDP provisions, he described the Tax Court as "adjusting to [its] new
responsibilities," in reviewing exercises of agency discretion. 28
Leading up to the enactment of RRA 98, the Senate Finance
Committee conducted hearings at which individuals testified about alleged
abuses by the IRS in its collections activities. 29 Aside from the political
rhetoric, leaders in the tax community, including the current National
Taxpayer Advocate Nina Olson, also testified about protecting taxpayers'
rights in the collection proceedings.30 In the spirit of Congress's desire to
impose limitations on the IRS's collection discretion and protect taxpayers,
RRA 98 created the CDP provisions to give taxpayers an opportunity for a
pre-deprivation administrative hearing and judicial review of the outcome
of the hearing.'
3. The CDP Hearing and Judicial Review
The CDP provisions changed the law by requiring the IRS to provide
notice to a taxpayer of a right to request a hearing prior to levying and within
27. HAROLD DUBROFF & BRANT J. HELLWIG, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT:
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 481 (2d ed. 2014), https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/book/Dubroff
_Hellwig.pdf.
28. Halpern, supra note 2, at 1289.
29. Commentators documented much of the "circus" of the Senate Finance
Committee's hearings. As Professor Cords notes, "Much of the testimony presented at
the hearings has since been either disputed or entirely discredited." Danshera Cords,
How Much Process Is Due? IR.C. Sections 6320 and 6330 Collection Due Process
Hearings, 29 VT. L. REv. 51, 52 & n.7 (2004) [hereinafter Cords, How Much Process Is
Due?].
30. IRS Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 2676 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 105th
Cong. 124-26 (1998) (statement of Nina E. Olson, Executive Director, Community Tax
Law Project, Richmond, VA).
31. I.R.C. § 6330(c) (2012); I.R.C. § 6330(d) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016); see RRA
98, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3401, 112 Stat. 685, 746-50 (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 6320; I.R.C. § 6320 note (2012); I.R.C. § 6330 (West 2011 & Supp. 2016)). For further
discussion, see Book, supra note 19, at 1156.
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five days of a filing notice of federal tax lien.32 The taxpayer has 30 days from
the issuance of the collection notices within which to request a hearing.3 3 If
a taxpayer makes a timely request for a hearing, he or she is entitled to one
hearing per period at issue to be conducted by an impartial appeals officer. 34
CDP hearings are informal, and the procedural rules governing the nature
of CDP hearings are spelled out in the regulations and case law. 35
32. I.R.C. § 6320(a) (requiring written notification of filing of a notice of federal tax
lien (NFTL) within five days of filing the lien); I.R.C. § 6330(a) (2012) (requiring written
notification of intent to levy).
Often the IRS issues both notice of intent to levy and notice of federal tax lien.
See IRM 5.19.8.2 (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm_05-019-008.html
#d0e274. I.R.C. § 6330(f) does not require the IRS to provide a taxpayer CDP rights if
the collection of tax is in jeopardy. A taxpayer whose assets are seized in a jeopardy
collection, however, will be entitled to post-deprivation administrative review. Treas.
Reg. § 301.6330-1(a)(2)(ii) (2016).
33. I.R.C. §H 6320(a)(3)(B), 6330(a)(3)(B). Hearing requests are often made via
Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing. IRM 5.1.9.2
(Feb. 7,2014), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm05-001-009.html#d0e119. If the hearing
request is not made within 30 days but is made within one year of the issuance of the
notice, a taxpayer is still entitled to an administrative hearing, referred to as an
equivalent hearing. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(i). The difference between a CDP hearing
and an equivalent hearing is that a taxpayer who engages in the latter is not issued a
notice of determination and is thus precluded from seeking judicial review of the
administrative appeals review of the proposed collection action. Id. § 301.6330-1(i)(2),
Q&A (6).
34. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(2), (3) (granting one hearing per period of unpaid tax, to be
conducted by officer with no prior involvement regarding the unpaid tax). For example,
if a taxpayer receives a levy notice and a NFTL for the same period, he or she is entitled
to only one CDP hearing for that period. See Inv. Research Assocs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 126
T.C. 183, 188 (2006) (holding time period for filing petition runs from first NFTL, not
from subsequent NFTL). If practicable, CDP hearings on a lien shall be held in
conjunction with CDP hearings on a levy. I.R.C. § 6320(b)(4); see also Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6330-1(d) ("To the extent practicable, the CDP hearing requested under section
6330 will be held in conjunction with any CDP hearing the taxpayer requests under
section 6320.").
The impartial hearing officer requirement mandates that the appeals officer
conducting the hearing must have "no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax."
I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A (4),§ 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A (4).
35. The formal hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act do not
apply. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A (6), 301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A (6); see, e.g.,
Robinette v. Comm'r, 439 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2006) (reviewing CDP hearings under
traditional standards for administrative law, even though appeals officers conduct
hearings informally). CDP hearings need not be conducted face-to-face; telephone or
document exchanges may suffice. Treas. Reg. §H 301.6320-1(d)(2), Q&A (6),
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The substantive issues considered at a CDP hearing can be divided as
follows: those on which the IRS has the burden and those on which the
burden falls on the taxpayer.36 The IRS, by way of the appeals officer
conducting the hearing, must verify that administrative procedure and
applicable law have been followed with respect to the alleged unpaid tax."
For example, the hearing officer must verify that the assessment was made
and made lawfully; that there is an unpaid assessment; that, if the taxpayer
disputes the underlying liability, the taxpayer did or did not have a prior
opportunity to dispute the tax liability at issue; and that all notices have been
issued.38 While the verification requirements are often thought of as a
routine checklist, in a messy CDP case there are so many potential avenues
for verification that an appeals officer may miss some of the nuances.39
The taxpayer may raise any relevant issues relating to the unpaid tax
including appropriate spousal defenses; challenges to the appropriateness of
the proposed collection action; offers of collection alternatives; and
challenges to the underlying liability.40 A taxpayer is only entitled to dispute
301.6330-1(d)(2), Q&A (6). Taxpayers do not have the rights to subpoena and examine
witnesses at CDP hearings. Id.
36. See I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1), (2) (2012).
37. Id. § 6330(c)(1).
38. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1(e)(1), 301.6330-1(e)(1). Verification can be made
anytime prior to the issuance of the notice of determination. Id. The appeals officer is
verifying that the IRS has complied with all requirements in the code, regulations, and
Internal Revenue Manual. See id.
39. As a simple example, if a taxpayer disputes the underlying liability, an appeals
officer may be tempted to prove that a taxpayer had a prior opportunity to dispute the
liability because of a transcript entry showing that a statutory notice of deficiency was
issued to the taxpayer. As a matter of proof, however, the IRS must demonstrate that
the notice was left at the taxpayer's last known address. See I.R.C. § 6212(b). This
involves obtaining proof beyond a transcript entry, such as a list of documents mailed via
certified mail to the taxpayer's last known address. Other issues, such as invalid
assessments, will require the appeals officer to examine underlying documents in
addition to the tax transcripts.
40. Id. § 6330(c)(2). With respect to the spousal defenses, a taxpayer may be
estopped from requesting relief if the IRS has already made a final determination on
spousal defenses from which the taxpayer had a prior opportunity for a judicial appeal.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A (4).
With respect to appropriateness of collection actions, a taxpayer may argue that
the IRS is enjoined from collecting a tax liability if the taxpayer has received a
bankruptcy discharge and that taxpayer's liabilities were dischargeable. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(a) (2012); e.g., United States v. Rivera Torres (In re Rivera Torres), 309 B.R. 643,
647 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004), rev'd in part on other grounds, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005).
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or challenge the underlying liability-that is, to assert he or she does not owe
the tax at issue-if the taxpayer did not receive a statutory notice of
deficiency or have a prior opportunity to challenge the liability.41 This
limitation prevents a taxpayer from having "two bites at the apple." 42
The scope of when a taxpayer may or may not raise a challenge to the
underlying tax liability sought to be collected is critical to the analysis of this
Article. "Underlying tax liability" refers to the amount of tax (including
interest and penalties) assessed, including tax assessed under deficiency
procedures, reported on a return, or a combination of both.43 For example,
if a taxpayer reports a tax liability on a return but does not pay the tax and
the IRS assesses the liability and does not issue a statutory notice of
deficiency, the taxpayer may properly challenge the liability at a CDP
hearing because the taxpayer has not had a prior opportunity to do so.44
However, if a taxpayer has received a statutory notice of deficiency with
respect to a period, regardless of whether the taxpayer exercised his or her
rights with respect to the deficiency procedures and sought review of the
deficiency in Tax Court, the taxpayer would be barred under principles of
res judicata from disputing the liability again in a CDP proceeding.45
A common issue raised at CDP hearings is collection alternatives such as posting
of a bond, substitution of assets, installment agreement, offer-in-compromise, and
withholding collection to facilitate future payment. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1(e)(3),Q&A (6), 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A (6).
41. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (2012).
42. Consistent with principles of the preclusion doctrines of collateral estoppel and
res judicata, a taxpayer may not raise the issue of liability twice. If a taxpayer is precluded
from raising the issue in the CDP hearing, he or she is also precluded from raising the
issue in a judicial review proceeding under § 6330(d). E.g., Goza v. Comm'r, 114 T.C.
176, 182-83 (2000).
43. Montgomery v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 1, 7-8 (2004), action on dec., 2005-03 (Dec.
19, 2005).
44. Id.
45. See Golden v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 33, 35 (2005), affd, 548 F.3d 487 (6th
Cir. 2008); Newstat v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-208, at 1300 (2004). Furthermore,
the notice of deficiency is not required so long as process where the IRS appeals division
could review the liability as a prior opportunity. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1(e)(3), Q&A(2), 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A (2); see also Bailey v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 392, 395
(2005). Examples of other opportunities to dispute a deficiency pre-assessment include
notice of proposed excise tax assessment; notice of proposed trust fund recovery penalty
assessment; notice that § 6682 penalty will be assessed; notice of proposed employment
tax assessment; and notice of proposed return preparer penalty assessment. E.g.,
Jackling v. IRS, 352 F. Supp. 2d 129, 132 (D.N.H. 2004) (proposed trust fund recovery
penalty assessment); Chun Hwan Lee v. IRS, No. 3-00-741, 2002 WL 508333, at *4 (M.D.
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Notably, the Tax Court held that the CDP provisions do not give the court
jurisdiction to determine an overpayment or order a refund or credit of taxes
paid.46 Compared to deficiency proceedings, where the Tax Court may
redetermine a deficiency or, if appropriate, an overpayment, 47 in CDP cases
the Tax Court has circumscribed its own jurisdiction to consider a taxpayer's
claim for an overpayment. 48
Once the appeals officer has verified that all applicable law and
procedures have been met and has considered the relevant issues raised by
the taxpayer, the appeals officer must apply the CDP balancing test.49 The
test articulated by the statute is "whether any proposed collection action
balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate
concern of the [taxpayer] that any collection action be no more intrusive
than necessary." 0 Upon conclusion of the CDP hearing, the appeals officer
must issue a notice of determination setting forth the findings of the officer
and applying the balancing test.51 The notice must also inform the taxpayer
of the right to judicial review by the Tax Court or district court.5 2
The CDP provisions provide that a taxpayer may seek judicial review
by the Tax Court within 30 days of the issuance of the notice.53 The
jurisdictional grant in the statute does not proscribe the Tax Court's
remedies, standard of review, or scope of review.5 4
Tenn. Feb. 21, 2002) (proposed excise tax assessment); Adams v. United States, No. CV-
S-01-0580-RLH LRL, 2002 WL 471765, at *1-3 (D. Nev. Feb. 14, 2002) (notice of I.R.C.
§ 6682 penalty).
46. Greene-Thapedi v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 1, 13 (2006).
47. I.R.C. § 6512(b) (2012), amended by Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-74, § 1101(f)(7), (g), 129 Stat. 584, 637-38 (striking the second sentence in subsection
(b)(3), effective January 1, 2018).
48. Greene-Thapedi, 126 T.C. at 11-14; id. at 14-15 (Colvin, J., concurring); id. at
15-16 (Vasquez, J., dissenting). The Tax Court's jurisdiction is discussed infra, Part III.B.
49. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(C).
50. Id.
51. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6320-1(e)(3), Q&A (8), 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A (8) (2016).
52. Id.
53. I.R.C. § 6330(d) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016).
54. See id. The Tax Court has addressed these issues in its review of CDP cases and
scholars have provided commentary. See Danshera Cords, Collection Due Process: The
Scope and Nature of Judicial Review, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1023 & n.13 (2005)
[hereinafter Cords, Collection Due Process]; Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court's
Jurisdiction over Due Process Collection Appeals: Is It Constitutional?, 55 BAYLOR L.
REV. 453, 500 (2003) [hereinafter Fahey, Tax Court's Jurisdiction].
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4. Scholarly Commentary on CDP
Since enactment of the CDP provisions, scholars, practitioners, and
policymakers have disputed the value and efficacy of CDP. Some scholars
and policymakers generally favor the policies underlying CDP-specifically,
increased taxpayer protections against intrusive government collection
actions.ss On the other hand, critics have claimed that CDP wastes
government resources, is used by tax protestors as a tool to delay or impede
tax administration, and is generally unwieldy and unworkable.56 There are
others who find virtue in CDP despite its costs. For example, Professor Steve
Johnson noted that the cost of CDP is extremely high compared to the value
it brings to protecting taxpayer rights, but nonetheless he asserted the value
of CDP as a "tripwire alerting the IRS to, and prodding it to correct, its
breaches of tax collection rules."" The majority of recent scholarship
examines the failures of CDP to provide meaningful adversarial checks on
IRS collection actions at a broad theoretical level.58
55. See Book, supra note 19, at 1147-49 (defending CDP as "a progression toward
adopting broader rule of law principles in the tax system"); see also NTA 2015 REPORT,
supra note 1, at 481-82.
56. Camp, Paradigm Shift, supra note 21, at 121-22 (suggesting that outcomes in
CDP cases show how "CDP provisions do little good and much harm"); Cords, How
Much Process Is Due?, supra note 29, at 54 ("CDP provisions as currently applied
provide few taxpayer rights, require significant administrative and judicial resources,
delay the collection of unpaid tax liabilities, and may adversely impact the public's
perception of the fairness of the tax system."); see also Steve R. Johnson, Reforming
Federal Tax Litigation: An Agenda, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 205, 265-67 (2013)
[hereinafter Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation].
The most recent exhaustive work is by Professor Bryan Camp. Professor Camp
argues that CDP does not add value to the collection process. Bryan T. Camp, The
Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84 IND. L.J. 57, 58 (2009)
[hereinafter Camp, Failure ofAdversarial Process]. Professor Camp's thesis is supported
by an empirical study of decisions and orders in 976 CDP cases issued by courts in years
2000-2006. Id. at 111-18.
Professor Steve Johnson argues that CDP's costs to the tax administrative
system have not been justified by the gains to taxpayer protection. Johnson, Reforming
Federal Tax Litigation, supra, at 266-67. Unlike Professor Camp, Professor Johnson calls
for modification of the CDP rules by removing judicial review from some types of agency
review. Id. at 267.
57. Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation, supra note 56, at 266-67.
58. See Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 56; see also Johnson,
Reforming Federal Tax Litigation, supra note 56.
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5. Empirical Data on CDP Cases and Outcomes
As noted, CDP cases make up approximately 5 percent of the Tax
Court's litigation docket, but the cases require a disproportionate amount of
resources by the court to resolve.59 CDP cases account for 28 to 35 percent
of the cases pending before the IRS Office of Appeals.6 0 One empirical study
reported that the IRS Office of Appeals closed an estimated 149,311 CDP
cases from 1999 to approximately 2006.61 Of those CDP cases considered by
the IRS Office of Appeals, 2 percent, or approximately 3,000, were appealed
to the U.S. Tax Court.62
The vast majority of CDP litigants are pro se. 63 Additionally, some
commentary links the inefficiencies of CDP to dilatory and frivolous
taxpayers who are seeking to delay collection."
59. DUBROFF & HELLWIG, supra note 27; see infra Part III.A.
60. NINA E. OLSON, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., IRS, PUB. 2104 (REV. 12-2003),
2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGREss 46 tbl.1.4.1 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/nta_ 2003_annual-update-mcw_1-15-042.pdf (giving statistics on the percentage of
IRS Office of Appeals receipts that were CDP receipts in recent years). By comparison,
prior to enactment of RRA 98, fewer than 14 percent of the caseload of IRS Office of
Appeals involved appeals of collection matters. Id. at 50.
61. Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 56, at 112.
62. Id. at 112 & n.279.
63. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Additionally, the NTA has
documented the likelihood of pro se litigants prevailing in CDP litigation. Of the 46 pro
se cases out of 79 CDP cases total brought before the Tax Court from 2014 to 2015 (a
decrease from 2013 to 2014), 89 percent of the pro se cases were decided for the IRS,
whereas in cases with represented taxpayers, the IRS prevailed 73 percent of the time.
NTA 2015 REPORT, supra note 1, at 429-30 & figs. 3.0.1 & 3.0.2.
Professor Camp's empirical analysis reveals that roughly 76 percent of CDP
cases were brought by pro se taxpayers. Camp, Failure ofAdversarial Process, supra note
56, at 114. In his analysis, he notes that taxpayers were less likely to prevail if they were
unrepresented. Id. at 114-15 (comparing 4.5 percent prevail rate for pro se taxpayers to
12.7 percent prevail rate for represented taxpayers). Professor Camp cautions the use of
this data to correlate success with representation because while represented taxpayers
may be better able to navigate the procedural process, the presence of lawyers or other
representation may act as a screening mechanism. Id. at 115.
64. Camp, Paradigm Shift, supra note 21, at 122 & n.620; see also Steve Johnson,
The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax Simplification,
51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1061 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, Compliance and Tax
Simplification] (citing Montijo v. United States, No. CVS011227LRH(LRL), 2002 WL
1466096, at *3 (D. Nev. May 14, 2002)).
Professor Camp noted that while there were numerous "tax protestor" and
"frivolous" arguments made in CDP cases in 2002 and 2003, there was a decline in the
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The percentage of cases that result in pro-IRS outcomes in CDP cases
is staggering. One empirical study shows that out of the 80 opinions issued
by courts from 2014 to 2015, taxpayers prevailed in only 17 cases.65 Another
study examines CDP cases from 2000 to 2006 and found that only 63 of the
976 cases were a "win" for the taxpayer.66 Experts disagree as to the reasons
why taxpayers are losing CDP cases. Some commentators focus on the fact
that CDP cases are likely to involve taxpayers making frivolous arguments,
who thus are more likely to lose.6 7 On the other hand, another commentator
has suggested that maybe the government usually wins CDP cases because,
"contrary to public perception," perhaps the IRS "does not utilize
oppressive and unreasonable collection tactics." 68 Furthermore, it is
suggested that CDP cases are usually resolved in favor of the government
because the CDP process works to resolve cases at the appellate level. 69
III. THE TAX COURT'S STRUGGLE WITH THE SCOPE OF ITS JURISDICTION
IN CDP CASES
This Part examines the U.S. Tax Court historically and compares the
Tax Court's jurisdiction in deficiency cases with that in CDP cases. This Part
also provides a detailed explanation of the court's struggle in determining its
proper jurisdiction in CDP cases in which the taxpayer raises issues in non-
CDP years by examining two relevant cases, Freije and Weber.70
percentage of cases attributable to these types of arguments. Camp, Failure of
Adversarial Process, supra note 56, at 116. This decline can be attributed to the
imposition of monetary sanctions made pursuant to § 6673. Id.
65. NTA 2015 REPORT, supra note 1, at 477. The data from 2014 to 2015 is not
unique. In an analysis of success rates in CDP cases from 2003 to 2015, the NTA reports
that court decisions range from 82 to 95 percent in favor of the government. Id. at 489,
fig. 3.5.2. In the years analyzed, taxpayers prevailed anywhere from 1 to 14 percent of
the time. Id.
66. Camp, Failure ofAdversarial Process, supra note 56, at 111-12. This data is both
over- and under-inclusive. Looking at Professor Camp's analysis reveals that the odds
are 99.999 percent that a collection decision will not be overturned. See id. at 114.
Professor Camp categorized each of the 63 taxpayer victories, and in 37 of those the
court found that the IRS made an error in its collection decision. Id. at 129-33 tbl.2.
67. E.g., Camp, Paradigm Shift, supra note 21, at 122-23; Johnson, Compliance and
Tax Simplification, supra note 64, at 1061-62.
68. Nick A. Zotos, Service Collection Abuse of Discretion: What Is the Appropriate
Standard of Review and Scope of the Record in Collection Due Process Appeals?, 62 TAX
LAW. 223, 235-36 (2008).
69. Id. at 237-38.
70. Weber v. Comm'r, 138 T.C. 348 (2012); Freije v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 14 (2005);
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A. The U.S. Tax Court
The U.S. Tax Court originated as the Board of Tax Appeals in 1924 to
adjudicate disputes involving federal income and profits taxes.71 Initially the
Board of Tax Appeals was "an independent agency in the Executive Branch
of the Government." 72 In 1942, Congress changed the name of the Board to
the Tax Court of the United States, but it remained an agency within the
Executive Branch. 73 In 1969, Congress established the Tax Court as a
legislative court under Article I of the Constitution, and the name was
changed to the U.S. Tax Court.74 Despite its history in the Executive Branch,
the Tax Court-and its predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals-has always
operated as an adjudicative body and not as an executive agency.75
Article I courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the Tax Court is
no exception. 76 It only has jurisdiction to the extent expressly authorized by
Congress. 77 Historically, the Tax Court's exercise of jurisdiction primarily
has been to resolve disputes between taxpayers and the IRS regarding
redetermination of tax deficiencies.78 There are three statutory requirements
see infra Part IV.
71. DUBROFF & HELLWIG, supra note 27, at 1.
72. Id. at 175 (quoting Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(k), 43 Stat. 253, 338).
73. Id. (citing Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957).
74. Id. (citing Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730).
75. Id. at 349 (noting that the Tax Court never functioned in any "administrative,
investigative, regulatory or policymaking capacit[ies]").
76. Id. at 384 (citing Flight Attendants Agai;nst UAL Offset v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d
572, 578 (7th Cir. 1999)) ("All federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. [There is]
no reason to suppose that statutes of limitations are intended to be administered
differently in the Tax Court than in federal district courts, which share jurisdiction in
federal tax cases with the Tax Court." (quoting Flight Attendants, 165 F.3d at 578)).
77. Henry Randolph Consulting v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 1, 4 (1999) (citations omitted).
78. DUBROFF & HELLWIG, supra note 27, at 269. The Tax Court's authority for
redetermining deficiencies is codified at I.R.C. § 6214(a) (2012). The majority of
deficiency cases involve income taxes, although the Tax Court also has jurisdiction over
deficiencies in excess profits, estate, and gift taxes. DUBROFF & HELLWIG, supra note 27,
at 269-70.
The Tax Court has jurisdiction over other matters with respect to determining
the underlying liability. For example, the Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear claims that
a taxpayer has overpaid taxes in cases in which the Tax Court has deficiency jurisdiction.
I.R.C. § 6512(b). The Tax Court also has jurisdiction to hear appeals made with respect
to jeopardy assessments. Id. § 7429(b)(2)(B). The scope of the Tax Court's jurisdiction
in overpayment and jeopardy assessment cases is beyond the scope of this Article. See
DUBROFF & HELLWIG, supra note 27, at 301-49, for a thorough explanation of the Tax
Court's jurisdiction in overpayment and jeopardy assessment cases.
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that must be met for the Tax Court to have deficiency jurisdiction. First, the
IRS must have determined a deficiency in tax.7 9 Second, the taxpayer must
be notified of the deficiency by way of a statutory notice of deficiency. 0
Third, a taxpayer must timely petition the Tax Court for review of the
deficiency.s" Once all three statutory requirements have been met, the Tax
Court has authority to review the deficiency for the year(s) or period(s) for
which the deficiency has been determined. 82 In limited circumstances, the
Tax Court may "consider such facts with relation to the taxes for other
years," only if doing so is necessary to determine correctly the amount of the
deficiency with respect to the year at issue.83
With the creation of CDP, the Tax Court also has jurisdiction to review
administrative hearings. 84 The statute that grants jurisdiction over CDP cases
does not mention the scope of the Tax Court's jurisdiction with respect to
non-CDP years.85 Furthermore, there is no statute analog for CDP as there
is in deficiency cases allowing the Tax Court to consider years not properly
before it if necessary to determine the CDP matter correctly.86
Unlike federal courts established under Article III of the Constitution,
the U.S. Tax Court, like other Article I courts, lacks general equitable
jurisdiction.7 The Tax Court has, on occasion, applied equitable doctrines to
resolve cases such as equitable recoupment, equitable estoppel, and
equitable innocent spouse relief. 8 Absent a direct statute, however, the Tax
Court's exercise of equitable jurisdiction may be unconstitutional. 89
79. I.R.C. § 6211(a) (defining deficiency as the difference between the proper
amount of tax and the amount shown on the return).
80. Id. § 6212(a).
81. Id. § 6213(a).
82. See, e.g., id. § 6214(a); Logan v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 1222, 1226, 1229 (1986).
83. I.R.C. § 6214(b). The statute expressly prohibits the Tax Court from
determining whether the year not properly before the court is over or underpaid. Id.
84. I.R.C. § 6330(d) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016). As discussed in Part II.A.3, the Tax
Court's jurisdiction in CDP cases has not been well defined by statute as to scope of
review, standard of review, and remedies available. See supra Part II.A.3.
85. See I.R.C. § 6330(d).
86. See discussion infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
87. Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court's Exercise
of Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 356, 393-98 (2001).
88. Id. at 378. For further discussion regarding equitable recoupment, equitable
estoppel, and equitable innocent sparse relief, see id. at 379-92.
89. Id. at 411-13.
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The Tax Court, as a court of limited jurisdiction and lacking general
equitable jurisdiction, is somewhat trapped when presented with a CDP case
in which a taxpayer seeks review of matters outside the boundaries of the
years or periods for which the IRS seeks to enforce collection. Tension exists
between a court of limited jurisdiction and traditional principles of judicial
efficiency.9 0 Add to that tension the policy and purpose of the CDP
provisions-to give taxpayers a pre-deprivation forum in collection cases-
and the Tax Court can easily find itself trapped. Generally and historically,
the Tax Court errs on the side of caution and does not exercise jurisdiction
where the issue is close. 91 Like other federal courts, the Tax Court follows
traditional preclusion doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to
ensure efficiency. 92
As our tax system is one based on annual accounting, the jurisdictional
scope of most cases before the Tax Court is defined by taxable periods,
namely years or quarters. 93 However, the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tax
Court in some types of collection cases is not certain. Uncertainty as to
jurisdiction leaves all parties with a feeling of unease. When the Tax Court
looks beyond the taxable period, it is like opening up a can of worms, the
shape and size of which are unknown. Sometimes opening up the can of
worms works out to align with the congressional intent behind the CDP
provisions-to ensure taxpayers have meaningful pre-deprivation
procedural checks on IRS collection actions. If the Tax Court can resolve
legitimate taxpayer issues that remain unresolved otherwise, opening up the
can of worms is necessary. There are times, however, where the Tax Court
need not open the can of worms and limiting the Tax Court's jurisdiction to
review CDP cases is more appropriate. This Article explores if and when the
Tax Court should open up the can of worms that is a non-CDP tax year.
CDP cases represent approximately 5 percent of the Tax Court's
90. See Cords, Collection Due Process, supra note 54, at 1023.
91. DUBROFF & HELLWIG, supra note 27, at 269-73 (citing and summarizing cases
in which the Tax Court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction).
92. E.g., Koprowski v. Comm'r, 138 T.C. 54, 59-60 (2012). Res judicata, or claim
preclusion, is a judicial doctrine to prevent repetitious lawsuits on the same cause of
action. Id. Res judicata promotes judicial efficiency in that unnecessary or redundant
litigation is precluded. Id. at 59.
93. I.R.C. § 441(a) (2012) (annual accounting rules); id. § 6214(a) (granting Tax
Court jurisdiction to redetermine deficiencies); id. § 6214(b) (limiting scope of
jurisdiction to tax years subject to determination by the IRS). While the specific type of
messy cases may be rare, they have arisen and will continue to present challenges to
taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts.
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overall docket.9 4 While the percentage of CDP cases on the Tax Court's
docket seems quite small, the workload and resources devoted to resolving
CDP cases by the Tax Court is disproportionately burdensome.95 Why are
CDP cases so time-consuming and challenging for the Tax Court? As
mentioned above, CDP cases are messy.9 6 Part of the problem is that the
CDP provisions provide a terse jurisdictional grant. I.R.C. § 6330(d)
provides that after a hearing a taxpayer "may, within 30 days of a
determination under [§ 6330], petition the Tax Court for review of such
determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such
matter)." 97 The Tax Court has expended considerable energy answering
questions about how it should resolve CDP judicial appeals.98 The statute's
94. DUBROFF & HELLWIG, supra note 27.
95. Id.
96. CDP cases are messy for a number of reasons. First, CDP cases often involve
unsophisticated pro se litigants who are often inefficient in their attempt to resolve their
disputes. In 70 percent of cases seeking judicial review of CDP determinations in 2002,
taxpayers represented themselves. NINA E. OLSON, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., IRS,
PUB. 2104 (REV. 12-2002), FY 2002 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 276 (2002),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/nta 2002_annual-rpt.pdf. One commentator has suggested
another contributing factor is that the CDP form, Form 12153 Request for a Collection
Due Process or Equivalent Hearing, is vague and does not provide a checklist for
taxpayers to indicate the issues he or she intends to raise. Book, supra note 19, at 1193-
94 n.183.
Second, CDP cases arise after an administrative hearing (or the opportunity for
a hearing) with the IRS appeals division. See Cords, Collection Due Process, supra note
54, at 1025-26. The IRS, like pro se litigants, is not known for its efficiencies. See id. at
1022 & nn.7-8.
Third and finally, CDP cases may be inherently messy because they arise out of
long-standing confusion or dispute between the IRS and the taxpayer that was not
resolved at any of the possible prior stages where resolution may have been possible-
from examination, administrative appeals, deficiency proceedings, administrative
collections, and finally administrative review of the collection. See, e.g., Freije v. Comm'r,
125 T.C. 14, 16-21 (2005).
In full disclosure, the Author worked for a number of years in the Small
Business/Self-Employed Division of the IRS Office of Chief Counsel, litigated a number
of CDP cases, and personally witnessed the challenges of resolving collection cases with
both unsophisticated pro se taxpayers and administrative errors made by the IRS. For
an example, see Leibold v. Comm'r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 104, 104 (2012). Contributing to
the confusion in Leibold v. Commissioner were assessment anomalies based on
substitute returns, amended returns, and the treatment of a prior separate return. Id. at
105 n.2.
97. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016).
98. DUBROFF & HELLWIG, supra note 27. "Given the number of division opinions
concerning the court's jurisdiction in the collection due process setting and, in particular,
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jurisdictional grant does not identify the level of deference the Tax Court
ought give to the hearing officer's determination, nor does it articulate the
scope of the Tax Court's review. 99 Much of the literature has focused on gaps
in the CDP provisions and how best to effectuate CDP with the competing
goals of protecting taxpayer rights and interest of the government in efficient
tax collection.o10 To answer these questions, the Tax Court and scholars have
debated the role of the Administrative Procedures Act and federal
administrative law.101 The Tax Court generally has not turned to
administrative law for guidance as it struggles with how to exercise its
jurisdiction properly in CDP cases. 102 Instead, the Tax Court has turned to
its jurisdiction in deficiency proceedings to help by analogy. 103
The Tax Court's limited jurisdiction in CDP cases is for good reason.
As Professor Brian Camp argued, one of the costs of CDP is that it may
"undermine[] the foundational role of the assessment in tax
administration." 104 The fear in CDP cases is that taxpayers may be able to
manipulate the system to litigate the underlying tax liability when, absent
CDP, they would be precluded from doing so. One example of this issue is
when a taxpayer seeks the Tax Court to consider a non-CDP year or period
in the Tax Court's adjudication of the collection issue. The Tax Court
the number of these cases yielding court-reviewed divided opinions, the perceived
portion of the court's resources allocated to these cases perhaps exceeded this statistical
evidence." Id.
99. Robinette v. Comm'r, 439 F.3d 455, 459-62 (8th Cir. 2006) (addressing scope of
review under § 6330 and limiting the appellate review to "information which was before
the IRS"); Goza v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 176, 181 (2000) ("[S]ection 6330 does not prescribe
the standard of review that the Court is to apply in reviewing the Commissioner's
administrative determinations .... ).
100. E.g., Cords, How Much Process Is Due?, supra note 29, at 53-54.
101. The Tax Court has consistently concluded that administrative law is
inapplicable in tax collection cases. See Robinette v. Comm'r, 123 T.C. 85, 96 (2004),
rev'd, 439 F.3d 455; Vierow v. Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-255, at 1529 (2004). Scholars,
on the other hand, suggest application of administrative law principles in collection cases
as a mechanism for consistency and to provide a substantive body of law in the absence
of statutory details in the CDP provisions. See Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and
Judicial Review of Tax Collection Decisions, 52 ST. Louis U. L.J. 429, 474-78 (2008);
Cords, Collection Due Process, supra note 54, at 1056-57.
102. Diane L. Fahey, Is the United States Tax Court Exempt from Administrative Law
Jurisprudence when Acting as a Reviewing Court?, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603, 604 (2010).
103. Id.
104. Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 56, at 104.
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examined the issue, with differing results, in the cases of Freije and Weber.0
B. Example of Freije as the Tax Court Extending Its Jurisdiction to Non-
CDP Years
In Freije, a CDP case in which the IRS issued a notice of determination
to proceed with collection by levy for the Freijes' allegedly unpaid liabilities
for 1997, 1998, and 1999, the taxpayers argued that the liability the IRS
sought to collect had already been paid.106 The Freijes made a remittance
they intended to apply to a CDP year-1997-but they did not specifically
designate their intention.107 Instead of applying it to 1997, the IRS applied
the remittance to a prior, non-CDP year in which the Freijes' had an
outstanding liability based on late filing and late payment penalties.108 The
CDP year remained unpaid, and the IRS instituted enforced collection
action by levy.1 09 That decision was affirmed by the IRS Office of Appeals." 0
On review, the Tax Court considered the liability in the prior year, reasoning
that the proposed collection action would have been inappropriate if the IRS
had improperly applied the remittance to a non-CDP year's tax for which
the taxpayer was not liable.' As the legal basis for expanding its jurisdiction
to consider the non-CDP year, the court stated that the issue in the prior
year was a "relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy"
and that the taxpayer was entitled to raise the issue.112
In arriving at the conclusion that jurisdiction was proper, the Tax Court
compared its jurisdiction in CDP cases to its jurisdiction in deficiency
cases." 3 Specifically, the Tax Court cited I.R.C. § 6214(b), a provision
limiting the court's jurisdiction in deficiency cases to years in which a
deficiency has been determined.11 4 Section 6214(b), allows (and even
requires) the court to consider facts from other years "as may be necessary
105. Weber v. Comm'r, 138 T.C. 348 (2012); Freije v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 14 (2005).
106. Freije, 125 T.C. at 19-21.
107. Id. at 17.
108. Id. at 16-17.
109. Id. at 19-20.
110. Id. at 20-21.
111. Id. at 28-29.
112. Id. at 26-27. The applicable CDP provisions provide that the IRS Office of
Appeals "shall" consider the issues raised by the taxpayer, including "any relevant issue
relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy." I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(B), (2)(A) (2012).
113. Freije, 125 T.C. at 27-28.
114. Id. at 27.
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correctly to redetermine the amount of such deficiency" for the years
properly before the court.115 Noting that there is no analogous provision to §
6214(b) in the CDP context, the court took the position that its exercise of
jurisdiction was consistent with the principles of § 6214(b) because the court
only considered facts from non-CDP years "insofar as the tax liability for
that year ... affect[ed] the appropriateness of the [proposed levy] for the
[CDP year]."116
The Tax Court thus heard evidence and considered the merits of the
late payment and late filing penalties in the non-CDP year.117 Essentially, the
court considered a challenge to the underlying liability of a non-CDP year
on the issue of whether the Freijes were subject to penalties in the prior
year.118
The ultimate result in Freije on the issue of considering a tax year not
in CDP favored the government. The Tax Court held that the taxpayers were
liable for the late filing and late payment penalties in the non-CDP year; that
the IRS properly applied the non-designated remittances to the non-CDP
year; and therefore, the CDP year remained unpaid.119 Despite this favorable
115. Id. at 28.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 28-29.
118. Id. The Freijes were entitled to challenge the underlying liability for tax year
1997 under § 6330(c)(2)(B). Id. at 22. The Freijes' assessment for 1997 was based on self-
reported income for which a statutory notice of deficiency was not issued. See
Montgomery v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 1, 9 (2004) (allowing taxpayers to challenge self-
reported liability under § 6330(c)(2)(B)), action on dec., 2005-03 (Dec. 19, 2005).
119. Freije, 125 T.C. at 37. Unfortunately, the dispute between the Freijes and the
IRS was fraught with more errors than misapplied payments. Freije was a particularly
messy CDP case because of other errors made by the IRS. Most notably, the Freijes sent
a check for $1,776 and the IRS erroneously posted the Freijes' account with a payment
for $11,776. Id. at 20. The IRS then accused the Freijes of writing a bad check. Id. When
the IRS erroneously credited the Freijes' account for tax year 1997 by an excess of
$10,000, it exceeded the amount of all unpaid assessments and the IRS generated a
refund of more than $5,000 to the Freijes which was issued in 1998. Id. at 30. When the
IRS became aware of the $10,000 error, it reversed the entries on the Freijes' 1997
account and applied remittances the Freijes' made for tax year 1998 to recover the
erroneously issued refund, contrary to law. Id. (discussing O'Bryant v. United States, 49
F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 1995), which holds the IRS may not use post-assessment collection
powers to recover an erroneous non-rebate refund). All is well that ends well, however,
and the IRS conceded in Freije that it could not levy on the portion that resulted from
the IRS's improper actions with respect to the collection of the erroneous refund. Id. at
37.
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outcome, the IRS bristled at the general rule established by the case: that in
reviewing IRS determinations to proceed with collection actions, the Tax
Court could consider facts and issues in non-CDP years to the extent they
are relevant to computing the unpaid tax. 120
In 2011, the IRS took the position that "Freije [was] incorrectly decided
to the extent it holds that a non-CDP period liability is a relevant issue in a
CDP hearing and that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine or
otherwise review the taxpayer's liability for a non-CDP period."121 The
potential consequences of the Freije opinion, which expanded the issues a
taxpayer could raise in CDP, include increasing the workload of the IRS, the
IRS Office of Appeals, and the Tax Court and creating an additional avenue
for a taxpayer to delay collections in CDP proceedings.
These potential consequences, however, did not come to pass. There
was no flood of CDP litigation with taxpayers seeking to litigate non-CDP
years via the CDP process. 122 Seven years after Freije, the Tax Court
confronted a similar issue and narrowed its holding from Freije. That case
was Weber v. Commissioner.123
C. Example of Weber as the Tax Court Limiting Its Jurisdiction to the CDP
Year
Weber was a CDP case in which the IRS issued a notice of
determination to proceed with collection by levy for the taxpayer's income
taxes for 2008.124 Weber argued that his 2008 liability had been paid by an
alleged overpayment on a trust fund recovery penalty (TFRP), for which he
had been determined a responsible person.1 25 Weber had overpaid his 2006
120. I.R.S. Notice CC-2011-021, at 2 (Sept. 19, 2011) [hereinafter I.R.S. Notice
CC-2011-021], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ccdmlcc-2011-021.pdf.
121. Id. at 3.
122. Despite commentators addressing the consequences of Freije, after Freije there
was no floodgate of litigation involving taxpayers raising non-CDP years during CDP
proceedings. See Ira B. Shepard & Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Recent Developments in
Federal Income Taxation: The Year 2005, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 5, 128-29 (2006)
(summarizing the holding in Freije); Recent Development, Tax Court Can Consider
Facts and Circumstances of Nondetermination Year Liabilities, 103 J. TAX'N 68, 68 (2005)
(same). Why not? It takes a special set of factual circumstances to create a Freije
situation.
123. Weber v. Comm'r, 138 T.C. 348 (2012).
124. Id. at 349.
125. Id. at 350. The TFRP is a mechanism for collecting from an employee, officer,
or owner of an employer those taxes the employer holds in trust. An employer is
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income tax liability and elected to apply overpayment to his 2007 personal
income tax liability.126 Before the end of the 2007 tax year, the IRS applied
the 2006 credit elect overpayment against the TFRP liability that was
assessed against Weber earlier in 2007.127 The TFRP was assessed against
Weber because he was determined to be a responsible person of S & G
Services, Inc., an entity that failed to pay trust fund taxes withheld for three
quarter periods in 2005.128 One or more other individuals were also
determined by the IRS to be responsible persons.129 The record in the case
shows the TFRP was satisfied, in part because other responsible persons
made payments on the liability.13 0 In an agreement to which Weber was a
party, Weber waived his rights to an appeals hearing on the TFRP.131 Weber
made an administrative claim for a refund of the portion of the TFRP he had
paid, which the IRS denied.13 2 Weber then filed suit in federal district court
challenging the disallowed refund.133 The IRS gave notice to Weber that the
credit elect overpayment from his 2006 tax year was credited to the TFRP.1 34
Despite the IRS's application of the overpayment credit elect to the TFRP,
Weber reported the same credit elect overpayment on his 2007 income tax
return.135 The IRS notified Weber that the 2007 credits he claimed, based on
the credit elect overpayment from 2006, were excessive. 13 6 Nevertheless, in
required to withhold income tax and an employee's share of Social Security and
Medicare tax (Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax) from an employee's
wages and remit the withheld amounts to the IRS. I.R.C. § 3102 (2012) (FICA
withholding); id. § 3402 (income tax withholding). The amount of tax withheld by an
employer is held in trust for the United States, and withheld taxes are referred to as
"trust fund taxes." Id. § 7501(a). To ensure that an employer pays the trust fund taxes
over to the IRS, § 6672 exists as a penalty mechanism. Section 6672 provides that the
officers or employees of the employer who are responsible for collecting and paying trust
fund taxes are "liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax" that remains
unpaid. Id. § 6672(a). Thus, the TFRP is a 100 percent penalty, equal to the amount of
unpaid employment tax. Responsible persons are held jointly and severally liable for
unpaid employment taxes. See id. § 6672(a), (d).
126. Weber, 138 T.C. at 349.
127. Id. at 350-51.
128. Id. at 350.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 351.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 351-52.
134. Id. at 352.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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2008 Weber reported the credit carried over from 2006 and 2007 to satisfy
his income tax liability. 13 7 Again, the IRS gave him notice that the 2008
credits claimed were excessive and that he had a balance due for 2008.138
When Weber failed to pay his 2008 liability, the IRS issued a notice of
proposed levy.'39 Weber requested a CDP hearing, claiming the TFRP
liability was more than fully satisfied and the IRS should restore the credit
elect overpayment from his 2006 income taxes to 2007, which would carry to
2007 and 2008 and satisfy his personal income tax liability for 2008.140
Weber raised two alternative arguments: (1) that the IRS Office of
Appeals should apply the claimed credit elect overpayment from 2007
(derived from the claimed credit elect overpayment from 2006); or (2) that
the IRS Office of Appeals should credit his 2008 income tax liability with the
alleged TFRP overpayment.141
The Tax Court denied both of Weber's requests. With respect to the
first argument, the Tax Court considered the merits of Weber's request to
apply the credit elect overpayment carried over from his 2006 income
taxes.1 42 Citing Landry v. Commissioner, the court said it had jurisdiction to
consider claims of credit elects that would satisfy a liability at issue.143 In
Landry, the Tax Court held it had jurisdiction to conduct a de novo review
of whether a taxpayer is entitled to the application of credits, reported on
prior years' tax returns, to satisfy an unpaid liability in a CDP year.'" The
court's decision in Landry was based on the fact that "the validity of the
underlying tax liability, i.e., the amount unpaid after application of credits to
which petitioner [was] entitled, [was] properly at issue."1 4 5
Having asserted jurisdiction, the Tax Court turned to the merits of
Weber's credit elect overpayment argument.14 6 The court held the IRS acted
within its discretion to apply the credit elect overpayment from Weber's
137. Id. at 352-53.
138. Id. at 353.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 359-60.
142. Id. at 360.
143. Id. (citing Landry v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 60, 62 (2001)).
144. Landry, 116 T.C. at 62.
145. Id. (citing Goza v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 176, 181-82 (2000)).
146. Weber, 138 T.C. at 360.
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2006 income tax return to Weber's TFRP liability. 147 The court noted that "if
the IRS holds Mr. Weber's money wrongly, it holds it not as an overpaid
2006 income tax but as an overpaid [§] 6672 penalty." 148 The court's analysis,
however, pointed out that there is no procedural mechanism for reporting
an overpaid TFRP liability as a credit to a taxpayer's income taxes.1 49
The court next addressed Weber's second argument: that the TFRP
liability was overpaid and the overpayment should be credited to his income
tax liability at issue in the CDP case.1 0 This required the court to determine
"whether, in a CDP case, [it had] jurisdiction to determine an overpayment
of an unrelated liability."15' The court held that it did not because the court
lacks refund jurisdiction in CDP proceedings.15 2 The court distinguished the
facts of Weber-holding the rule announced in Freije to be inapplicable.' 5 '
In Freije, the court held that a claim that an unpaid tax had been paid was a
"relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy," under the
CDP provisions.15 4 Specifically, in Freije, the court said "meaningful review
of a claim that a tax sought to be collected by levy has been paid by means
of a remittance or an available credit will. . . [warrant] consideration of"
non-CDP years.' In Weber, however, the court narrowed the scope of what
constitutes an "available credit."1 56 An available credit might include credit
carryover prescribed by statute that affects the liability for a CDP year, an
overpayment determined in a refund or other suit that had not yet been
refunded or credited, or an overpayment the IRS determined
administratively that had not yet been refunded or credited."' An
undetermined claim for refund of an alleged overpayment of an unrelated
tax does not constitute an available credit so as to justify the court's
jurisdiction over a period (and type of tax) not subject to the CDP
proceedings. 58
147. Id. at 361.
148. Id. at 362.
149. Id. at 369.
150. Id. at 362.
151. Id. at 366.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 368-69.
154. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Freije v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 14, 26 (2005)).
155. Id. at 363 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Freije, 125 T.C. at 26).
156. Id. at 361-62 (quoting Freije, 125 T.C. at 26).
157. Id. at 368.
158. Id.
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As support for its position, the court discussed how the CDP provisions
do not confer any refund jurisdiction on the court.159 Instead, CDP litigation
is generally restricted to the periods for which the IRS seeks to enforce
collection in the notice of lien or levy. 60 The court also highlighted other
problems with exercising jurisdiction over Weber's allegation that the TFRP
was overpaid. 161 First, the court noted how Weber waived his right to an IRS
Office of Appeals hearing on TFRP liability. 162 The CDP provisions prohibit
review of underlying liability if a taxpayer had a prior opportunity to be
heard on that issue; therefore, to consider the underlying liability in a
subsequent proceeding after Weber waived such review would frustrate the
congressional intent to offer one opportunity for review of the liability.163
Second, the court speculated the potential wait on resolution of the
collection of the 2008 income tax could be significant to the IRS because of
the complexities and nature of resolving TFRP cases.'" Third, the court
struggled with how, if a taxpayer could raise an unrelated liability in a CDP
case, such a decision could cut against taxpayers. 16 Could, for example, the
IRS in turn raise unrelated liabilities or counterclaims in refund suits? 166
Fourth, the court raised the problem of parallel litigation and the lack of
statutory authority to resolve which court should cede jurisdiction pending
the other court's resolution.1 67 Commentary about the Weber case generally
noted the pro-government holding of the case.1 68
159. Id. at 369.
160. Id. Weber's argument would have the effect of turning the CDP process into
"an almost plenary review of the taxpayer's situation vis-A-vis the IRS for all liabilities
and for all periods; and a delinquent taxpayer would have the power to halt IRS
collection of any given tax simply by filing a refund claim for any other tax, however
unrelated it might be to the tax that the IRS proposed to collect." Id. at 369-70.
161. Id. at 370.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 370-71.
165. Id. at 371.
166. Id.
167. Id.; cf I.R.C. § 7422(e) (2012) (resolving conflict between Tax Court and
district court jurisdiction in deficiency cases and refund litigation, but not CDP cases).
168. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr. et al., Recent Developments in Federal Income
Taxation: The Year 2012, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 503, 694-95 (2013) (commenting "Ca-ching!
The IRS collects twice").
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE TAX COURT'S
JURISDICTION OVER NON-CDP YEARS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
EXTRA-JUDICIAL RESOLUTION
A. The Proper Scope of the Tax Court's Jurisdiction and Critique of Freije
The proper scope of the Tax Court's jurisdiction over non-CDP years
depends on the factual circumstances of a taxpayer's case and the arguments
a taxpayer makes. This Article categorizes the types of facts and arguments
into three scenarios. Two of the three scenarios present cases in which the
question of the Tax Court's jurisdiction is answered relatively simply. The
third scenario, as exemplified in the Freije case, is more difficult. This Part
addresses the three scenarios and provides critical analysis of the Tax
Court's exercise of jurisdiction in Freije.
1. Scenarios One and Two: The Easy Cases to Resolve in Which a Taxpayer
Asks the Tax Court to Consider Facts from a Non-CDP Period
The question of to what extent the Tax Court ought to consider facts
from non-CDP years can arise in three different factual scenarios. 169 The first
scenario occurs when a taxpayer alleges that a credit from a prior or later
year applies to satisfy the tax liability in the CDP year or period. The second
scenario is when a taxpayer alleges that an overpayment of an unrelated tax
liability of the same taxpayer would satisfy the tax liability in the CDP
period. The third scenario is when a taxpayer alleges that he or she has made
remittances or payments that were improperly applied or otherwise should
have been applied to the tax liability in the CDP year or period. 1 0 The
proper scope of the Tax Court's jurisdiction depends on which factual
scenario the case arises under. Each scenario and the scope of the Tax
Court's jurisdiction in each scenario are discussed in turn.
With respect to the first scenario, a taxpayer might claim that the tax
liability in the CDP year has already been satisfied by payment, credit, or
adjustment from a year either before or after the CDP periods.171 The Tax
169. There may be other reasons in a CDP case for a taxpayer to request appeals
and the Tax Court to consider facts outside the CDP year. I am not aware of any such
cases.
170. See infra Part IV.A.2.
171. For example, net operating losses that carry forward or back under § 172,
general business credits under § 39, and overpayment credit elects from a prior year are
all types of credits from prior or subsequent years that operate to reduce the liability at
issue in a given tax year. I.R.C. § 39; I.R.C. § 172 (2012 & Supp. II 2014); Treas. Reg.
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Court has jurisdiction to consider the fact or existence of a credit, from a
prior or later year, because the non-CDP year credit directly relates to the
existence of the tax liability in the CDP year.17 2 The allegation of a credit
from a prior or later year that would effectively eliminate the tax liability in
the CDP year is an argument by the taxpayer relating to the underlying
liability in the CDP year itself.173 Therefore, in cases where the taxpayer
claims credits from other years that affect the tax imposed for the CDP
period, the IRS and Tax Court can properly consider the facts from non-
CDP years as part of the determination of the liability for the CDP year.
There is one major limitation to the Tax Court's jurisdiction in such a case.
The CDP provisions preclude relitigation of the tax liability when a taxpayer
has already had a prior opportunity to dispute the liability.174 However, the
limitation prohibiting relitigation is unrelated to the issue of whether the Tax
Court can consider facts from a non-CDP year. If a taxpayer is not otherwise
precluded from raising the underlying liability, the Tax Court properly
exercises jurisdiction in considering whether a prior or later year tax credit
applies to eliminate the liability for the CDP year or period.
The second scenario occurs when a taxpayer might claim he or she
overpaid or has a credit from an unrelated liability and is seeking to apply
the alleged overpayment from the unrelated liability to the CDP period.
Such was the case in Weber where the taxpayer argued the IRS should apply
an alleged overpayment of the taxpayer's employment tax liability for a
corporation to offset the taxpayer's personal income tax liabilities.'7 In
Weber, the Tax Court declined to consider the merits of the taxpayer's
allegations that he had overpaid his employment tax liability.176 Instead, the
Tax Court held it lacked jurisdiction to consider the application of alleged
§ 301.6402-3(a)(5) (2016) (allowing election for overpayment credit to apply in
succeeding taxable year). In Weber, the Tax Court refers to this scenario as when a
taxpayer has an "available credit," or a credit that affects the liability for the CDP period
directly. See 138 T.C. at 368.
172. Landry v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 60, 62 (2001); see supra notes 121-22 and
accompanying text.
173. See Landry, 116 T.C. at 62.
174. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (2012); see supra Part II.A.3; supra note 43 and
accompanying text. The preclusion from relitigating operates whether or not a taxpayer
has availed himself or herself of the opportunity to dispute the liability. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A (2).
175. Weber v. Comm'r, 138 T.C. 348, 362 (2012); see supra note 151 and
accompanying text.
176. See Weber, 138 T.C. at 366.
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overpayments in unrelated liabilities during the course of a CDP appeal.17
2. Scenario Three: The Tax Court's Jurisdiction over Non-CDP Years
Where the Taxpayer Alleges Remittances Were Improperly Applied and a
Critique of Freije
The third scenario occurs when a taxpayer alleges the IRS improperly
applied payments or remittances the taxpayer intended to be applied to
liability in the CDP year. If a taxpayer alleges the IRS improperly applied
payments to other tax periods or liabilities, the Tax Court is called on to
resolve whether the IRS properly applied the payments."' Resolving the
issue of whether the IRS properly applied payments made by a taxpayer
requires the Tax Court to address the merits of an issue with respect to tax
years or periods not at issue in the CDP case.1 79 This third scenario is the
most troubling to the Tax Court, and there is no simple answer for the
appropriate scope of the Tax Court's jurisdiction in this scenario.
When a taxpayer makes a voluntary payment, the taxpayer is entitled
to designate the liability the taxpayer wishes to pay.18 o If a taxpayer fails to
designate the payment, the IRS has discretion to apply the payment. 181 An
allegation by a taxpayer that he or she has paid the liability with a remittance
(as in Freije) is not the same as an allegation that a credit from a prior or
later year applies to satisfy the liability (as in the first scenario). 182 The Tax
Court has been quite clear on this issue. In a memorandum opinion in a later
case, the Tax Court said, "[Q]uestions about whether a particular check was
properly credited to a particular taxpayer's account for a particular tax year
are not challenges to [the] underlying tax liability." 183 In contrast, a taxpayer
who alleges that a credit from a prior or later tax year was improperly
applied is challenging the underlying liability.184
177. Id.
178. See id. at 366-67.
179. E.g., Freije v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 14, 37 (2005).
180. See Tull v. United States, 69 F.3d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1995); Rev. Proc. 2002-26,
2002-1 C.B. 746, 746.
181. Rev. Proc. 2002-26, 2002-1 C.B. at 746 (allowing the IRS to apply partial
payment in "order of priority that [it] determines will serve its best interest"); see Rev.
Rul. 73-305, 1973-2 C.B. 43, 43 (allowing the IRS to apply partial payment in specific
order), superseded by Rev. Proc. 2002-26, 2002-1 C.B. 746.
182. See Freife,.125 T.C. at 25-26; supra Part IV.A.1.
183. Kovacevich v. Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, 4 (2009) (footnote omitted).
184. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, allegations that a taxpayer has paid a liability (and
that the IRS failed to apply the payments as the taxpayer intended) are
different from the facts in Weber.8s A taxpayer who alleges he or she
intended for remittances to apply to a CDP year is not arguing that an
overpayment in an unrelated liability should eliminate the CDP liability.18 6
In Freije, the court explained how it interprets the question of
application of payments. The application of remittances is an issue relevant
to the unpaid tax in the CDP year. 87 While the remittance is a "relevant
issue," the Tax Court implies the remittance is not a challenge to the liability
that would be precluded. 88 The proper application of a remittance goes to
the existence of the unpaid tax, but it is not a challenge to the amount or
existence of the underlying liability.189 It is a ministerial matter, rather than
a substantive argument.
Having distinguished remittances from liability challenges and
overpayments on unrelated liabilities, the next issue is whether the court
should exercise jurisdiction over a non-CDP period if the facts and issues
that require resolution do not relate to the liability for the CDP period. The
CDP provisions simply grant the Tax Court jurisdiction to review
administrative hearings if the taxpayer seeks review within a specific time
frame.190 The statute granting jurisdiction to the Tax Court does not
specifically address the scope of the jurisdiction, and the limitation is implied
by the scope of what is properly in dispute in the administrative hearing.' 9 '
In Freije, the court analogized a statute that allows the court in
deficiency cases to consider issues in a non-deficiency year if necessary to
the resolution of the deficiency year.192 The court in Freije used the analogy
185. See supra Part III.C.
186. See, e.g., Weber v. Comm'r, 138 T.C. 348, 368 (2012).
187. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A) (2012) ("The person may raise at the hearing any
relevant issue relating to the unpaid tax or the proposed levy .... ); Freije, 125 T.C. at
26.
188. Freije, 125 T.C. at 26-27, 27 n.14.
189. See id. at 26.
190. I.R.C. § 6330(d) (West 2011 & Supp. 2016). The statute provides that a taxpayer
"may, within, 30 days of a determination under [§ 6330], petition the Tax Court for
review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to
such matter)." Id.
191. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2) (2012); see supra Part II.A.3; supra notes 104-08 and
accompanying text.
192. Freije, 125 T.C. at 27-28 (citing I.R.C. § 6214(b) (2000)).
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to support its decision to exercise jurisdiction over the non-CDP year for
which the Freijes allegedly remitted payment.1 93
In general, it is not useful to compare the Tax Court's jurisdiction in
deficiency cases to that in collection cases. The standards of review are
generally different, as are the remedies the court fashions.1 94 However, the
Tax Court is called on to resolve questions in collection cases and it must do
so despite the lack of express statutory guidance. The extensive statutory
scheme that guides the Tax Court in deficiency cases is instructive as to the
boundaries of the Tax Court's jurisdiction. In cases such as Freije,
analogizing the Tax Court's jurisdiction in deficiency cases is a useful guide
for the Tax Court because Congress has spoken so clearly with respect to
deficiency cases.195 As the Tax Court did in Freije, the court should continue
to look to its jurisdiction in deficiency cases as a basis for comparison in CDP
cases. The Tax Court can remain flexible in order to resolve messy CDP
cases when there is no other available arena for resolving the issue.
The Tax Court's opinion in Freije aligns with the purpose of CDP. The
intent behind CDP is to give taxpayers pre-deprivation review of proposed
collection actions.1 96 The Tax Court's refusal to consider the merits of an
issue in a non-CDP period in Weber, though it appears not to permit pre-
deprivation review, were justified because the taxpayer in that case had
another remedy and other judicial review available through other
procedures.1 97 In Weber, the Tax Court suggested that the taxpayer could
seek review via other statutorily granted procedures (i.e., a claim for refund
on the allegedly overpaid trust fund recovery penalty).1 98 In Freije, there was
no other avenue available for the taxpayers to have their allegation
considered that remittances should apply to the CDP year.1 99
Finally, the Tax Court's exercise of jurisdiction in Freije has not opened
the floodgates of litigation with respect to non-CDP years.200 The Tax Court
193. Id. at 28.
194. See Robinette v. Comm'r, 439 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2006); supra Part II.A.3.
See generally Cords, How Much Process Is Due?, supra note 29 (providing background
on the CDP provisions and procedures).
195. See Freije, 125 T.C. at 27-28.
196. Cords, How Much Process Is Due?, supra note 29, at 52-53.
197. Weber v. Comm'r, 138 T.C. 348, 369-72 (2012).
198. Id. at 371.
199. See Freije, 125 T.C. at 26-37.
200. See, e.g., Weber, 138 T.C. at 369 (finding the petititioner extended Freije beyond
its "breaking point").
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is traditionally mindful of the limited nature of its jurisdiction and has not
sought to expand it.201 As evidenced by the Tax Court's restraint in Weber,
the Tax Court is not eager to expand its jurisdiction. 202 The Tax Court's
flexible and functional approach to cases involving non-CDP year issues
allows it to serve as the final arbiter when absolutely necessary but not to
engage in every dispute.
B. Recommendations for Pre-litigation Resolution
Messy CDP cases persist. Clarification from Congress in the form of a
statutory fix is not a reliable solution.203 The Tax Court does a commendable
job of sorting out the cases in which it should extend its jurisdiction and those
in which it should not.
The most efficient resolution of CDP cases is for them to be resolved
prior to litigation. Professor Camp opined, "At bottom, it is simply not
201. See id. at 369-70 ("Most tax litigation is restricted to a specific taxable period at
issue, and in a CDP hearing Appeals 'review(s] only a particular collection episode-a
given notice of lien or notice of proposed levy."' (quoting Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C.
114, 164 (2010), aff'd, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012))).
202. See id.
203. While Congress has the authority to expand the Tax Court's jurisdiction to
resolve the jurisdiction dispute that arose in Freije, as a practical matter, a comprehensive
statutory solution would be cumbersome and potentially unworkable. There are too
many possible variations of facts involving issues from non-CDP years. A statutory fix
that addresses all of the possible permutations would be cumbersome. Congress would
have to specify the various issues a taxpayer would be permitted to raise from non-CDP
years. For example, as spelled out in the case law, the statute would most likely have to
provide for consideration of non-CDP years in a case where the taxpayer was requesting
an examination of the application of payments (assuming the underlying liability was not
properly at issue); versus an examination of the application of credits from a prior or
subsequent year (only if the underlying liability is properly at issue); versus an entirely
separate liability, such as a trust fund recovery penalty overpayment. On the other hand,
if Congress wished to divest the Tax Court of jurisdiction in non-CDP years entirely, that
would be simple.
Divesting the court of jurisdiction to resolve messy cases involving non-CDP
years would go against the purpose of CDP, which is to grant non-frivolous taxpayers
pre-deprivation judicial review of collection actions. See supra Part II.A.2.
Whether Congress will address this is an entirely different issue. There is some
argument that the Tax Court's jurisdiction in CDP cases where a taxpayer raises the
underlying liability is unconstitutional. See Fahey, Tax Court's Jurisdiction, supra note
54 (positing that the Tax Court's de novo review of a taxpayer's challenge to the
underlying liability in CDP cases raise both due process and separation of powers
concerns).
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possible for CDP judicial review to either catch or correct the IRS's abuse
of taxpayers." 20 4 As Benjamin Franklin said, "an ounce of prevention is
worth a pound of cure." 205 A number of potential administrative solutions
could prevent litigation of these messy cases. These are not novel or
profound suggestions; to the contrary, they are intensely practical. These
suggestions are politically unpopular at a time when Congress is more
interested in decimating the budget of the IRS. 206 The National Taxpayer
Advocate predicts that with the reduction of customer-facing services by the
IRS, as planned in the IRS's "Future State" initiative, there will be an
increase in tax litigation because taxpayers will lose their ability to resolve
their disputes with the IRS.2 07 As Judge Halpern said, "Recourse to the Tax
Court is a high-cost alternative to resolving disputes that, in many cases,
could more efficiently be resolved by telephonic or face-to-face contact
within the agency." 208 These comments and predictions are probably
especially true for messy CDP cases.
1. The IRS Should Resolve More CDP Cases
The IRS took the position that Freije was wrongly decided, perhaps
because the IRS feared floodgates of litigation,20 9 but most definitely
because the IRS is concerned about the workload of its departments. In
response to the IRS's position, history has not borne out the fear that CDP
litigants would attempt to litigate in non-CDP years at every opportunity.
There are other sufficient protections for frivolous CDP requests by way of
court-imposed monetary sanctions. 210 The IRS ought to embrace Freije cases
as opportunities to rectify past errors in a less costly manner.
In recent years, Congress has decreased the budget for the IRS Office
204. See Camp, Failure of Adversarial Process, supra note 56, at 89.
205. Letter from B Franklin to Samuel Johnson (Sept. 13, 1750), in The Papers of
Benjamin Franklin, FRANKLINPAPERS.ORG, http://franklinpapers.org/franklin//framed
Volumes.jsp;jsessionid=8433DO4B670A52689FCE32ADC7849A67 (last visited Feb. 9,
2017). Though technically this Part is about how the Tax Court can efficiently resolve
questions about its jurisdiction, the suggestions contained are to prevent messy CDP
cases from being litigated in the first instance.
206. See Forman & Mann, supra note 4, at 728.
207. NTA 2015 REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4.
208. Halpern, supra note 2, at 1289.
209. See I.R.S. Notice CC-2011-021, supra note 120, at 3; supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
210. I.R.C. § 6673 (2012).
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of Appeals, and there are fewer Appeals Officers to resolve pending cases.21 1
The number of hearing officers with the Office of Appeals has declined from
924 in fiscal year 2013 to 705 in fiscal year 2016.212 A messy case like Freije
may take longer to resolve; therefore, the IRS Office of Appeals needs
sufficient and competent hearing officers to consider thoroughly such cases.
Typically, in CDP cases, hearing officers heavily rely on transcripts of a
taxpayer's account. 2 13 The transcripts contain information, using IRS codes,
regarding correspondence between taxpayers and the IRS.2 14 To build and
analyze the facts of a CDP case, if not in all cases, the IRS Office of Appeals
should develop the administrative record with copies of the actual
underlying documents rather than rely on the transcript information alone.
For example, in Freije, if the hearing officer had obtained copies of the
canceled checks the taxpayer remitted, the hearing officer would have been
more likely to see the errors the IRS made, and the IRS Office of Appeals
could have corrected the errors prior to litigation. 21 5
This recommendation, though it would create a more efficient system
for resolving cases, depends on Congress adequately funding the IRS so that
the IRS can have sufficient staff to work the cases.
2. The Taxpayer Advocate Service Should Resolve More CDP Cases
Administratively, taxpayers could also benefit from general taxpayer
service representatives with problem-solving skills. In the spirit of RRA 98,
providing taxpayers with helpful taxpayer services-that have the capability
to analyze messy cases involving multiple tax years-could go a long way
toward resolving cases before litigation.216 Unfortunately, the IRS appears
to be moving away from providing taxpayer services in its "Future State." 217
211. 1 NINA OLSON, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., IRS, Annual Report to Congress
2016, at 203-04 (2016), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/
2016ARC/ARC16_VolumelMSP14_Appeals.pdf. According to the National
Taxpayer Advocate, the overall increasing caseload with fewer Appeals Officers to work
the cases contributes to the increasing case load of cases pending before the U.S. Tax
Court. Id. at 205.
212. Id. at 204.
213. See IRM 21.2.3 (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part2l/irm_21-002-
003r.html (setting forth IRS policy on transcripts).
214. Id.
215. See Freije v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 14,17-19 (2005).
216. See supra Part II.A.2.
217. The IRS has set an initiative to move away from in-person and telephone
services to a more automated and electronic system. See IRS Future State, IRS,
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The National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson, raised concerns that moving
away from providing live support will actually increase compliance costs
because "many taxpayer problems are not 'cookie cutter."' 218 Again, this
solution requires Congress adequately to fund and support the National
Taxpayer Advocate's office to provide competent, quality taxpayer services.
V. CONCLUSION
Messy collection cases will continue to hamper our tax administration
system. The IRS is too big and cumbersome to be perfect; there is no solution
to ensure all taxpayers will have effective representation in their disputes.
But questions about how the Tax Court and IRS resolve messy cases,
particularly CDP cases involving non-CDP years, do not have to absorb as
much of the resources as they have historically. The Tax Court can continue
to apply a flexible approach to its jurisdiction, as it did in Freije, and the IRS
can create administrative solutions to the problem.
http://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-future-state (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
218. NTA 2015 REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5. The NTA recognizes that the messy
cases are the difficult ones to solve. Olson argues the future state will be ineffective to
resolve complex or messy cases because (1) many taxpayers do not use the Internet; (2)
taxpayers may not feel comfortable resolving complex financial transactions over the
internet; and (3) even assuming Internet use, a taxpayer may find that the tax issue or
money at stake makes online resolution impractical or undesirable. Id. at 7-8.
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